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Indirect reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for cooperation, and seems to be of particular interest for
the evolution of human societies. A large part is based on assessing reputations and acting accordingly.
This paper gives a brief overview of different assessment rules for indirect reciprocity, and studies them
by using evolutionary game dynamics. Even the simplest binary assessment rules lead to complex
outcomes and require considerable cognitive abilities.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In The Descent of Man, Darwin (1872) wrote that in contrast to
other social animals such as bees or ants, mans ‘motive to give aid
no longer consists solely of a blind instinctive impulse, but is
largely inﬂuenced by the praise and blame of his fellow men’. Why
should we attach weight to purely symbolic incentives such as
praise and blame? Probably because they are often associated
with more material incentives. It would make little sense to strive
for a good image if all were treated equally. What others know
about us is likely to affect the way we are treated.
In many modern approaches to the evolution of human
cooperation, the quest to obtain a good image in the eyes of
others is relatively neglected. Both in theoretical investigations
and experimental tests, it is often assumed that players are
anonymous. In real-life interactions, anonymity is less frequent.
Usually, we have some information about the individuals we
interact with, and are concerned about our own image.
In this paper, the role of reputation in indirect reciprocity will
be reviewed. Indirect reciprocity is one of the ‘ﬁve mechanisms of
cooperation’ (Nowak, 2006), and arguably the one that is most
special to humans. But it should be stressed right away that
(a) reputation plays an important role in other forms of coopera-
tion too (not just in indirect reciprocity), and that (b) conversely,
there exist forms of indirect reciprocity which are not based on
reputation assessment. This will be taken up in more detail in the
discussion.
The canonical approach towards explaining altruistic acts
(which, by deﬁnition, imply a cost to agents who confer beneﬁts
to others) is based on a long philosophical tradition. It aims totics, University of Vienna,
x: þ43 01 4277 9506.
 BY-NC-ND license.show that the costs can be recouped in the long run, so that they
are self-interested after all. In other words, it means to ‘take the
altruism out of altruism’ (Trivers, 2006).
The simplest scenario in this context is that of reciprocal
altruism, usually modeled as a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(Trivers, 1971). The recipient of a helpful action returns help at
some later occasion. This is the basis of direct reciprocation. ‘You
scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours’. With indirect reciprocity,
the helpful action is returned, not by the recipient, but by a third
party. ‘You scratch my back, and someone will scratch yours’. This
promise seems even more suspect than the previous one. Why
should anyone shoulder my debt, and pay vicariously, in my
stead?
Among the several variants of indirect reciprocity, the best
known is based on reputation (Sugden, 1986; Alexander, 1987;
Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Brandt and Sigmund, 2006). Help is
channeled toward those who have acquired the reputation to be
helpful. In this way, exploiters are repressed.2. Reputation assessment
The simplest model is based on a large, well-mixed population
of players randomly meeting each other (Nowak and Sigmund,
1998a,b). The probability that the same two players meet more
than once is negligible, in such a scenario. Whenever two players
meet, chance decides who is in the role of the (potential) donor
and who is recipient. Donors decide whether or not to confer a
beneﬁt b to the recipient, at a cost c to themselves. As usual, it is
assumed that cob. Donors providing help acquire the image G
(for good), and donors refusing help the image B (for Bad). Thus
players have binary images, entirely determined by what they
decided when last in the position of donor. We can then consider
three strategies: (1) the unconditional helpers AllC who always
provide help, (2) the unconditional defectors AllD who always
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help recipients if and only if these have a G-image. This strategy is
the obvious analog of TFT (tit for tat). It refuses help to those
players who, in their previous round, refused to help. We denote
by x,y and z the frequencies of the three strategies (xþyþz¼1).
If a population contains only two of these strategies, the
outcome is the same with direct as with indirect reciprocity
(Brandt and Sigmund, 2006). AllD players dominate AllC players.
The competition of AllD with the conditional strategy is bi-stable,
as long as the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b is smaller than the
probability w for another round (with the same partner, in direct
reciprocity, and with some other partner, in indirect reciprocity).
In a mixture of unconditional and conditional co-operators, both
do equally well. In order to avoid this dynamic degeneracy, and
also to add a realistic feature, we assume that with a probability e,
an intended help is not implemented (see also Fishman, 2003;
Fishman et al., 2001; Lotem et al., 1999). In this case, there exists
a stable coexistence between AllC and CondC. In the interior of the
simplex D3 which corresponds to the state space of the popula-
tion (x,y,z), the replicator dynamics (see e.g., Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998) admits a line of rest points, which joins the
AllDþCondC equilibrium with the AllCþCondC equilibrium and is
given by a constant value of z. In the vicinity of the AllCþCondC
equilibrium, these rest points are stable (but not asymptotically
stable, of course). These stable rest points correspond to highly
cooperative populations. In the long run, however, a sequence of
arbitrarily small endogenous perturbations could eventually push
the population into the homogeneous state y¼1 corresponding to
the ﬁxation of AllD (Fig. 1). Hence cooperation can prevail for
some time, in this model, but will ultimately break down.
Although the details of the dynamics differ, the same conclusion
holds with direct reciprocity too, if CondC is replaced by TFT. (We
assume, in both cases, that the cost c is smaller than the
discounted beneﬁt that can be expected in the following round,
i.e., wbð1eÞ. If this does not hold, the triumph of AllD is
immediate.)
One of the reasons for the failure of CondC lies in its para-
doxical nature. A conditional co-operator who refuses help to a
player with image B acquires that image too. The CondC-player
can, by helping a G-recipient on the next opportunity, redress that
image. But during some time, the player is branded, and less likely
to receive help. In this sense, the act of punishing a B-player is
costly. The strategy can help to uphold cooperation in the
population (for a while), but this comes at a price.             x
cooperators
reciprocators
             z
  y
defectors
Fig. 1. The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity, with the unconditional
strategies AllC, AllD and the reciprocating strategy CondC. Full circles correspond to
stable ﬁxed points, and empty circles to unstable ﬁxed points (stability being
understood in the sense of Lyapunov: all close-by states remain close-by).There is an obvious way to repair this weakness. It consists in
discriminating between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed defection. The
same problem had already been treated in the context of direct
reciprocation. It is well known that a pure TFT-population is greatly
plagued by errors in implementation. Each such error provokes a
chain of backbiting. A variant of TFT called Contrite TFT can over-
come this problem. It is based on the notion of ‘standing’ (Sugden,
1986). In a similar vein, Sugden suggested that assessments, in
indirect reciprocity, should take into account whether the recipient
of a refusal to help had a B- or a G-image. Only the latter refusal
should be considered as bad, and entail a B-image to the non-
helping Donor. ‘A player can keep his good standing even as he
defects, as long as the defection is directed at a player with bad
standing. We believe that Sugden’s strategy is a good approxima-
tion to how indirect reciprocation actually works’.(Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998a) This point was taken up by a number of authors
(Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001).
This opens up a vast range of ways of assessing actions, (i.e.,
attributing a G- or a B-image), even if the actions are not directed at
the observer. A ﬁrst-order assessment rule simply depends on
whether the donor helps the recipient or not. A second-order
assessment rule takes into account, additionally, whether the
recipient has a G-image or a B-image. A third-order assessment rule
can depend, additionally, on the image of the donor. It may make a
difference whether a B-player or a G-player provides help to a
B-player. Altogether, there are 28¼256 third-order assessment rules.
A strategy, in this indirect reciprocity game, depends not only
on the assessment rule (i.e., how the player judges actions
between two other players), but also how such an assessment is
used to reach a decision on whether to help or not. A player could,
for instance, decide to give help only to G-players. But the player
could also take into account the own image, and help, for
instance, whenever the own image is B, so as to remove the
blemish as quickly as possible. There are 16 such action rules
(including the two unconditional rules AllC and AllD, which do not
depend on the assessment), and hence 4096¼256 16 different
strategies conceivable in this set-up (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004;
Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). Not surprisingly, most are nonsensical,
such as, for instance: ‘view everyone as G who fails to give to a G
player, and help if and only if your own image is different from
that of your recipient’.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004, 2006) have shown that there exist,
among the 256 assessment rules, only eight which can lead to
cooperation, if the whole population embraces them. Each of
these ‘leading eight’ is stable in the following sense: there exists a
speciﬁc action rule such that no dissident minority using another
action rule can do better, and invade. (In particular, AllC or AllD
cannot invade.) None of these ‘leading eight’ is of ﬁrst order. Each
distinguishes between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed defection. The
eight rules agree on several points. It is always good to give help
to a G-player, and always bad to withhold help from a G-player.
Moreover, a good player refusing help to a B-player does not loose
the G-image. There remain three situations: namely when some-
one (with image G or B) helps a B-player, or when a B-player
refuses help to a B-player. This yields the 23¼8 assessment
systems belonging to the leading eight. Two of them are of second
order, and in the following we shall only deal with them. They
both agree in viewing (rather oddly) that a B-player refusing to
help a B-player obtains a G-image. They disagree on whether it is
good to help a B-player or not. The assessment that views it as
good will be termed MILD, the other STERN. (The former has been
studied by Sugden, 1986, the latter by Kandori, 1992). For both
MILD and STERN, the corresponding action rule is: give help if and
only if the recipient has image G. (In particular, the own image
will not inﬂuence the decision). The corresponding strategy will
again be denote by MILD resp. STERN.
             x
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Fig. 2. The replicator dynamics of indirect reciprocity, with the unconditional
strategies AllC, AllD and the reciprocating strategy MILD (or STERN).
Fig. 3. The image matrix (bij) in a population of 100 MILD players (top) resp. 100
STERN players (right). The white and black pixels correspond to good (or nice)
resp. bad (or nasty) images. It is assumed that q is 99%. The state, after 20 000
interactions, corresponds to a stationary distribution. The probability e to
mis-implement an intended donation is 0.1. (From Uchida, 2010).
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population consisting of the two unconditional strategies AllC and
AllD and either the MILD or the STERN strategy (Ohtsuki and
Iwasa, 2007; Sigmund, 2010). In each case, we obtain a bi-stable
situation (Fig. 2). But what happens if both the MILD and the
STERN strategy occur together in the population? This is not
obvious. It is important to note that the stability of the leading
eight merely means that no other action rule can invade. This
does not imply that no other assessment rule can invade.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2007) and Panchanathan and Boyd (2004)
have assumed that all members of the population agree in their
assessment. This means that every player has either the G- or the
B-image in the eyes of all players. These authors would accept the
view that it is unlikely that all players observe all interactions, but
they assume that every interaction is observed by one player,
whose assessment is then shared by all. No matter whether this is
a likely scenario or not, it has clearly to be abandoned as soon as
one is interested in the competition of several assessment rules.
Assuming that assessment rules are private, c.f. Brandt and
Sigmund (2005), Pacheco et al. (2006), and Takahashi and
Mashima (2006), this raises the question: which moral norm is
likely to become established in the population?
Thus G and B mean different things in the eyes of a MILD or a
STERN observer. To distinguish them, we may say that a player
can be good or bad when assessed according to the MILD rules,
and nice or nasty when assessed by the STERN rules. A priori, then,
a player can be good and nice, good and nasty, bad and nice, or
bad and nasty.
The replicator dynamics of a population consisting only of
players adopting the MILD or the STERN strategy is disappointing.
There is no selective advantage one way or the other, the segment
representing all possible mixtures of MILD and STERN consists of
rest points. If we add unconditional AllC- and AllD-players to the
population, we observe a bi-stable outcome. Depending on the
initial condition, either a homogeneous AllD population will
emerge, or a stable mixture of MILD and STERN. The best that
can be said is that STERN has a slight advantage, in the sense that
whenever there are equally many STERN and MILD players
(together with AllC-players), the ratio of STERN to MILD will
increase (Uchida and Sigmund, 2010).
This analysis, so far, has relied on the assumption of perfect
information. Every players knows about every interaction, either
by direct observation or through gossip. This is clearly an
unrealistic assumption. If we want to give it up, we must assume
that every player has a private list of the images of all other
players. Thus the image matrix ðbijÞ consists of entries G or B,depending on whether player j has image G or B in the eyes of
player i. Whenever player j is donor to some recipient player k,
then those players i who observe the interaction will have an
occasion for updating their image of j. The new entries will
depend on bik and bjk(since we assume only second-order
assessments, the image of the donor plays no role). But if player
i does not observe the interaction between j and k, the value bij
remains unchanged.
If observers are chosen at random, this updating process
corresponds to a Markov chain on the space of image matrices.
A rigorous analysis seems to offer considerable challenges. Uchida
(2010) has investigated the stochastic process by means of
extensive computer simulations. The outcome is striking (See
Fig. 3). The smallest deviation from the perfect-information
condition has disastrous consequences for a homogeneous popu-
lation of STERN players. In the long run, every entry of the image
matrix is G or B with equal probability. The entries are uncorre-
lated. Thus effectively, a STERN player is not doing any better than
a player letting a coin-toss decide between helping or not.
Compared with this, a homogeneous population of MILD players
does much better. A large majority of them will keep agreeing on
the images of their co-players. (The percentage depends only on
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on the probability q to observe a given interaction.) A CondC
population, on the other hand, ends up with a bad image for
everyone. But a mixture of CondC and AllC can keep cooperating:
meeting with an AllC-player provides the conditional co-operators
with an opportunity to redress their image. Clearly, this works
also in the case of perfect information.
In order to obtain an intuitive feeling for these results, we may
look at the updating process for bij. For ease of notation, we
replace the entries G resp. B by 1 resp. 0. With probability ð1qÞ,
the entry remains unchanged. With probability q, it will be
replaced by the new image of j in the eyes of player i. This is
1 if either (a) j gives to k, and i approves, or (b) j refuses to help k,
and i approves. The probability that j helps k is ð1eÞbjk, and the
probability that i approves is 1 if i follows the MILD or CondC
assessment rule, and it is bik in the case of STERN. The probability
that j refuses to help k is 1ð1eÞbjk, and the probability that i
approves is ð1bikÞ if i follows theMILD or STERN assessment rule,
and it is 0 if i plays CondC. If we assume (wrongly) that the images
of k in the eyes of i and j, i.e., bik and bjk, are independent,
and if we denote by hij the expected value of bij etc, then in
the stationary equilibrium, where hij ¼ hjk ¼ h by symmetry,
we obtain for the CondC, MILD and STERN assessment rules,
respectively:
ð1eÞh¼ h,
ð1eÞhþð1ð1eÞhÞð1hÞ ¼ h,
ð1eÞh2þð1ð1eÞhÞð1hÞ ¼ h:
The corresponding solutions are h¼0, h¼ ð1þ ﬃﬃep Þ1 and h¼ 12,
respectively. Of course the independence assumption is false, but
in the case of small q it is a justiﬁable assumption, since different
players are unlikely to base their assessments on the same
observations.
This handful of results is a striking illustration of the fact that
information conditions are of the utmost importance, for reputa-
tion-based indirect reciprocity (cf. Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2007).
This was stressed already in the ﬁrst papers on this topic. In
Nowak and Sigmund (1998a,b), q denotes the probability that a
player knows about the reputation of another player, i.e., has
some information about the behavior of that player. With prob-
ability 1q, the co-player is unknown. In this case, it is assumed
that the recipient receives the beneﬁt of doubt, i.e., is held to be a
G-player. CondC-players could resist invasion by AllD players if
q4c=b (or, in a more elaborate model, if coqwbð1eÞ). In Uchida
(2010) q is the probability that a given player observes the last
action of a co-player. If not, then the co-players former image will
remain unaltered. Eventually, models will have to encompass
both types of uncertainty. It could be that in Alice’s eyes, player
Bob is a stranger. It could also be that Alice knows Bob, but has
missed Bob’s last action as a donor.
Whatever the interpretation of q, it seems likely that it is not a
constant. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that the social
network of a player grows with time. In this case, the player will
be more and more likely to know the reputation of their
recipients, or to have observed their latest interactions. In
Fishman et al. (2001), Mohtashemi and Mui (2003) and Brandt
and Sigmund (2005), it is shown that appropriate assumptions
can turn the CondCþAllC equilibrium into a stable attractor, able
to repel invasion attempts by AllD-minorities.
It is an obvious weakness of all models considered so far that
they are based on a very short memory only. Assessments are
updated according to the action last observed. In real life,
reputations are not always based on one action only. If we know
that a player has cooperated for a long time, but suddenly thatplayer defects in one interaction, we will not necessarily lose our
good opinion of that player (but rather assume that the recipient
deserved no better). In particular, Berger (forthcoming) has
shown that a tolerant ﬁrst-order assessment rule (Tolerant Scor-
ing) can stably sustain cooperation. Such an assessment with
built-in tolerance against single defections can be based on
sampling two actions in the recipients past.
Several models consider a more sophisticated evaluation
system, for instance with a score that is not binary (see e.g.,
Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, or Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001).
This provides stability to cooperation: a few isolated defections
will not destroy the good reputation that a player has accumu-
lated, but only slightly reduce it. In another vein, Suzuki and
Akiyama (2007a,b) have analyzed indirect reciprocity for interac-
tions in larger groups, and found a wealth of interesting dynamic
behavior. The evolution of norms in multi-level selection models
has been studied by Chalub et al. (2006) and Pacheco et al. (2006).3. Discussion
Historically, studies of indirect reciprocity were based on
direct reciprocity (see, e.g., Rosenthal, 1979; Ellison, 1994;
Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995). In a certain sense,
however, indirect reciprocity can be viewed as the primary
phenomenon, and direct reciprocity as a special case, based on
direct experience, as a recipient, of the co-player’s action. In any
case, direct and indirect reciprocation are likely to interact (see
Dufwenberg et al., 2001). Thus, players who start a repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction with some co-player are likely to
be guided by that co-player’s past behavior towards others, and to
defect in their ﬁrst move if they have seen their co-player defect
on others. The corresponding strategy ObserverTFT (Pollock and
Dugatkin, 1992) is an interesting link between TFT and CondC.
(Whereas the usual TFT-player, on engaging with a new partner in
a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, always provides help, an
ObserverTFT also takes into account how that new partner
behaved in interactions with others, and in particular defects in
the ﬁrst round if and only if this new partner was last seen
defecting.)
Roberts (2008) has pointed out that in small populations, the
assumption that players interact at most once is implausible. If
the probability of re-meeting is sufﬁciently large, CondC will be
superseded by strategies based on direct experience. But a
second-order assessment based on three images (good, bad, and
neutral) exploits advantageously the supplementary information
conveyed by reputation and proves superior to strategies based
on direct experience only.
It seems plausible that humans do not have separate modules
for playing direct reciprocity or indirect reciprocity. Similarly,
behavior in direct or indirect reciprocity affects, and is affected, by
behavior in public good games (Milinski et al., 2002a,b;
Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004). A good reputation for cooperating
in dyadic interactions is likely to promote the reputation for
cooperating in larger groups, and vice versa. (In this context,
it may be noted that non-punishers will, in general, not be
punished, see Kiyonari and Barclay (in press), just as rewarders
will often be rewarded in turn. The former issue is an Achilles heel
for cooperation based on negative incentives. The latter is an
advantage for cooperation based on positive incentives.)
Both direct and indirect reciprocity rely on the implicit
assumption that players act consistently, and that past behavior
allows to infer future actions.
An impressive number of experiments have shown that
indirect reciprocity works (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000;
Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002; Bolton et al., 2005; Seinen
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ingly, many players seem to content themselves with ﬁrst-order
assessment, possibly because higher-order assessment is cogni-
tively taxing (Milinski et al., 2001). Obviously, information trans-
fer is of utmost importance (see, e.g., Sommerfeld et al., 2007).
Of particular interest are the large-scale experiments unwittingly
provided by e-trading (Keser, 2002; Bolton et al., 2004). In e-Bay,
for instance, the remarkably high level of honesty is supported by
a very simple assessment system based on the satisfaction of
customers with their partners. This measure (amalgamated over
six months) does not take into account the reputation of the
customers themselves who evaluate their partner, and hence is of
ﬁrst-order.
Ever since Triver’s seminal paper on reciprocal altruism
(Trivers, 1971), it is known that reciprocation need not be based
on repeated interactions between the same two players only.
There exist different notions of generalized reciprocation (see e.g.,
Boyd and Richerson, 1989). What we have described is reciproca-
tion based on reputation: players known for being helpful are
more likely to be helped, not necessarily by their recipients, but
possibly by others who return the help vicariously, so to speak.
Vicarious reciprocation is also known as up-stream reciprocity.
We may say that help is caused by a feeling of admiration (Shalizi,
2011). Down-stream reciprocity occurs when a player who has
been helped returns the help, not to the donor, but to a third
party. This can be viewed as misguided reciprocation, caused by a
feeling of gratitude. Such misguided reciprocation is well docu-
mented by experiments, not only on humans (Yamagishi et al.,
1999; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Engelmann and Fischbacher,
2009; Rutte and Taborsky, 2007; Rutte and Pfeiffer, 2009; Barta
et al., 2011). So far, the only theoretical models that support it
seem to require some structured population, and localized inter-
actions (Pfeiffer et al., 2005).
The promise of a reward (i.e., a positive incentive) can be used
to promote cooperation, if individuals are opportunistically moti-
vated to help whenever they can expect a reward (Hauert et al.,
2001). Switching from positive to negative incentives, we note
that an individual with a reputation for punishing cheaters is less
likely to be exploited. Hence, acquiring such a reputation can be
beneﬁcial (Hauert et al., 2001; Semmann et al., 2004; Hilbe and
Sigmund, 2010). So far, there seems only one experimental paper
supporting this view, see Barclay (to appear). All these mechan-
isms (indirect reciprocity, positive and negative incentives) can be
viewed as instances of generalized reciprocity, and the corre-
sponding strategies as offspring of TFT.
In a larger context, explanations of cooperation based on the
handicap principle, such as competitive altruism, also rely on
reputation (Zahavi, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Bshary and Grutter,
2006; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010). An individual who is known
as a good co-operator is more likely to be chosen as partner than an
individual known for free-riding. The resulting partner-market may
well be the most important aspect of reputation-based cooperation.
Our reputation can greatly affect our economic opportunities. This
agrees well with Darwin’s view that praise and blame can have an
important inﬂuence on our willingness to help others.Acknowledgment
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